N. A. BERDYAEV (BERDIAEV)
Journal Put', aug./oct. 1938, no. 57, p. 84-86.
NEW BOOKS
__________
Jean Grenier, Essai sur l'esprit d' orthodoxie. Gallimard.
(1938 - #435)
The book of Grenier mirrors the inner drama of French intellectuelles.
The title itself can lead to a misunderstanding.1 The book is written not about religious orthodoxness, but rather about Marxist orthodoxness, which
far more onerously weighs upon the consciousness and conscience of the creators of spiritual culture. The French
intellectuelles still do not know that terrible tyranny, which accompanies the triumph of orthodoxness in life,
they know only the ideological preliminaries. Moreover, it mustneeds be said, that every triumphing orthodoxness
is tyrannical. The Marxist orthodoxy, after Marx already taking form by means of the myth-creating process,
bears a formal affinity with the old religious orthodoxies, but it is more impudently brazen in the realisation
of its pretensions. The drama of the intellectuelles, sympathetic to the social aspirations of Marxism and Communism,
yet not consenting to accept the tyranny of orthodoxness, was acutely experienced by A. Zhid and he with honour
left off from the contradiction, set before him. A man, who strives for truth and values truth, cannot accept
any sort of a binding social orthodoxness, even though he be sympathetic to the social aims, with which this
orthodoxness is connected. A man, not bereft of his conscience, cannot accept lies, obligatory, as a social
duty. Grenier is such a man of conscience, he values truth, for him the knowledge of truth has value, irrespective
of the social struggle and practical aims. He is an idealist. It was with agitation that I read his book, since
it reminded me of my youth. I was moreso a Marxist, than Grenier, but I could not accept the Marxist orthodoxy
out of a love for truth, independent of the class struggle. In philosophy I was not a materialist, I was pervaded
by the ideals of German Idealism, chiefly by Kant and partly by Fichte, I believed in the unconditional character
of truth and good, rooted in the transcendental consciousness. This led me to a break with Marxism, which I
fully sympathised with socially. Already then, though there still did not yet exist the Communists, they demanded
an orthodoxy, the acceptance of Marxism, as a totalitarian system. The Marxist orthodoxy could tend to produce
the impression of an intellectual doctrine, but it was foremost a weapon of the revolutionary struggle. Orthodoxy
always was a weapon for struggle, and suchlike also was the Christian orthodoxness. The orthodoxness bears a
sociological character. Religious orthodoxness is bound up with the social-organising side of religion. The
purely religious experience of the encounter of man with God does not beget dogmatism. Dogmatism is the by-product
of the socialisation of religion. The orthodoxy of Marxism is bound up not with the scientific nor even with
its political side, but rather with its religious, its religiously inverted side. In Soviet Russia all the philosophic
disputes transpire not under the standard of the discerning of truth and error, but under the standard of a
discerning of orthodoxy and heresy. The categories of orthodoxness and heresy however are neither scientific
nor philosophic, but the rather religious, more specifically so theological. The Marxist orthodoxy, one of the
most intolerant orthodoxies in the history of human thought, is a theological scholasticism. In the book of
Grenier one can find many accurate critical observations concerning Marxism and its orthodox pretensions. Yet
his opposition to Marxist orthodoxy is not a matter of agitation, only but purely intellectual. He defends first
of all the independence and freedom of culture and cultural values. And in his defending of humanistic culture
he is a typical Frenchman. His book ends with an open letter to Malraux, who moreover is not so much a Marxist,
as rather a Nietzschean.
All the thoughts of Grenier, evoking disquiet as regards
modern orthodoxies and totalitarianisms, lead to an acknowledging of the primacy of spirit. Consciousness for
him is determinative of being. But he does not get down at depth at the philosophic side of the problem. He
displays chagrin at the conformism of the intellectuelles, who get caught up in the temptation of totalitarianism.
I think, that this is determined not by that the intellectuelles tend to sense the social truth of the totalitarian
movements, but rather their asocial character, their dread of struggle. The intellectuelles ought to realise,
that they are representatives of spirit, and not of society, not of the state, not of the people, not of a class.
They ought to speak words of truth and right, not dependent upon utility, nor altogether socially indifferent.
On the contrary, they ought to stand up for the socially just-truth, and not consent to lies, though these be
in the name of the realisation of this just-truth. Marx and Nietzsche, two of the most influential thinkers
in the modern world, variously and in the name of differing aims have altered the understanding of truth. Truth
became a by-product of the social struggle or of the will to power. And herein arose a crisis in the relationship
of man to truth. Communism and Fascism alike deny the existence of truth in the old sense of the word and they
do this in the name of their totalitarian principle. And one mustneeds understand, that this signifies a pretentiousness
to the totalitarian outlook, since in it there is a distorted truth. Christianity is likewise totalitarian,
it is a total truth embracing all the whole of life, but this sort of totalitarianism has nothing in common
with Marxist orthodoxy nor with totalitarian states. Spiritual truth is totalitarian and it relates to the human
person, not to society, the state, the nation, the collective, the class, all matters in which everything is
partial. Society does not comprise it nor can it make pretense to integral wholeness and fullness, only the
person can make such a claim, and it is as a task, not as a given. From whence also is evident the fatal error
of an orthodoxy. An orthodoxy acknowledges society (be it religious, or national or social a collective) as
the bearer of the integral wholeness of truth, which is bindingly obligatory for the person. But in society
everything is partial, not integrally whole, not totalitarian, whereas the integrally whole totalitarian truth
is a task, facing the person, which it has to resolve in common with other persons, in a communitarian spirit.
Christian totalitarianism, so very distinct from formal liberalism and individualism, presupposes freedom, as
the setting of the verymost totalitarian truth. Totalitarianism be it Marxist or Fascist denies freedom, i.e.
it admits only of such a freedom as appears the offspring of necessity of the social or national organisation.
The perspective, which has to be set in opposition to the orthodoxness and totalitarianism, is not individualism,
as such egocentric and indifferent to truth, but rather personalism, comprising in itself an universal content,
i.e. a communitarian personalism. The pathos of orthodoxness is nowise the pathos of truth, for it signifies
moreso an indifference towards truth and the manipulation of intellectual doctrine for purposes of struggle
and the ends of the organisation. An orthodoxy, as the fullness and integral wholeness of truth, is not a given
and cannot be as such bindingly obligatory with any sort of societies, even though religious, for it reveals
itself upon the "pathway" and in "life". The book of Grenier leads towards these thoughts and in this is its
merit.
Nikolai Berdyaev.
1938
© 2005 by translator Fr. S. Janos
(1938 - 435 -en)
(NOVIYA KNIGI:) JEAN GRENIER, ESSAI SUR L'ESPRIT D'ORTHODOXIE. GALLIMARD. Under "New Books"
section in Journal Put', aug./oct. 1938, No. 57, p. 84-86.
1 trans. note: Berdyaev uses here the term "ortodoksiya"
for "orthodoxy" or "orthodoxness" rather than the Russian Orthodox Christian term "Pravoslaviye" for "Orthodoxy".
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