On the Social Doctrine of the Moscow Patriarchy

by Yakov Krotov

My article, piblished by Obshchaia gazeta, 31 August 2000, translated by Paul Steeves.

Uncle Sandro from Chegem was proud that during the period of collectivization he bolshevized nature:  he beat on a hollow tree and the tree cried out "Hollow Collective."  The "Bases of a social concept" approved by the bishops' council of the Russian Orthodox church is as much like the social concept of the Roman Catholic church as a hollow tree is like a collective farm. The Orthodox bishops themselves provided the occasion for comparing them with the Catholics when they called their council a "jubilee council." The Catholic custom of special "jubilee" years and assemblies is unknown to the eastern tradition. The introduction of this term into use is a significant testimony.  But of what? Of becoming like Catholicism? Of an attempt to adopt its experience?

The social doctrine of the Catholic church has been formulated in documents of the papacy and especially in the materials of the Second Vatican Council that was held in the first half of the sixties. When its participants were advised to vote for the documents that had been previously prepared in the Vatican, suddenly a revolt broke out, an open revolt in the presence of thousands of invited guests. A debate began which lasted several years. Every word in the concluding document was the result of subtle intellectual and political arguments.

Nothing of the kind happened at the recent council of the Russian Orthodox church. Bishops unanimously confirmed the "Bases of a social concept," which had been prepared in the bowels of the patriarchate. Was that because the document was completely agreeable to them in all details? Or because they attached no special significance to it and had not read it carefully and did not intend to adhere to it? The latter is more likely. While in the West a document that has been adopted is a law that must be fulfilled, in Russia even the law is simply just a document and nobody is obligated to it.

What kind of historical circumstances the council was held in was obvious from the first enthusiastic responses. "Nezavisimaia gazeta" proclaimed the victory of the liberals inasmuch as the bishops voted for a continuation of the dialogue with the heterodox. But wasn't it rather sparse?  Sure the bishops agreed to continue to send their theologians to the West. They even agreed to receive foreign theologians here, "for study of Orthodox theology."  It's obvious progress; under Stalin people were not let out of Russia for any money and they were not let into Russia.

But now, for example, many parish priests in Moscow warn parishioners that those who pray with heretics, Catholics and Baptists, will be barred from communion. What did the council say on this matter? Is it possible to pray with a Baptist at the bedside of a dying person for his recovery? Is it possible to pray with a Pentecostal before a meal? If a Catholic drops in at an Orthodox church and joins in the common prayer, are all the words addressed to God blocked and do not reach heaven? Several of our priests during baptism carefully check the crosses to see whether they are Orthodox because on "Catholic" crosses the feet of the crucified are arranged differently. Maybe a "heretic sign" should be placed at the entrance of each church and those who enter be required to spit on it as proof of Orthodoxy? The "concept" does not give an answer to these questions.

The council forbade priests "immediate participation in intelligence activity or any other activity that requires by state law maintaining secrecy even at confession and in reporting to the church hierarchy." This means that a priest must not become an intelligence agent. The reason for the decision is rather strange: for a priest to be an informer, it seems, is not bad because this is a betrayal of the trust of the flock but because this infringes upon the right of the superior to know everything about the priest and his flock.

Who of the authors of the concept decided to express dissatisfaction and suggested that a person who has received a "criminal order" during war could appeal to a priest? In this case a pastor "should call the penitent to sincere repentance, that is, to a renunciation of evil intent," and if this does not help then "to warn those whose lives are threatened with danger."

One may ask: what kind of terrorist will go to make confession, and if one nevertheless does so, would he repent of the plan to blow up a bomb? What kind of soldier would begin to repent of his intention to fulfill a criminal order? And if, contrary to all expectations, some half wit does such a surprising thing, how could a priest "warn," while "taking care for keeping secret the name of the penitent and other circumstances that could reveal his identity"? It is like saying "someone is going to shoot you but unfortunately I cannot tell you under what circumstances." All of the casuistry is necessary in order to demonstrate one's inner freedom from the state. A really free person and free organization would not embark on such demonstrations.

The resolution of the council prescribes that Orthodox Christians "act in a legal fashion against undoubted violations by society or government of the statutes and commands of God and if such legal action is impossible or ineffective, then occupy a position of civil disobedience." Such theoretical expression of disapproval could evoke enthusiasm in those who praise all kinds of authority, so long as it is "genuine"--strong, with flashing sword and hard horse whip. To an extent such talk is simply flirtation with the state:  "See I love you, but I could turn my back on you!" From this one draws the conclusion: "Not only has the totalitarian period, but also the post-totalitarian period of the history of the Russian Orthodox ended, which has defined in its development both society and the state."

There is some hypocrisy in the approval of civil disobedience by people who in the course of decades obeyed the most varied orders of the atheist state. Besides, civil disobedience is possible in a civil society where a person has a choice: to pay or not to pay taxes, to vote or boycott elections, or to serve in the army or go to jail. But this is not Russia's problem, where from most of the population taxes are deducted beforehand and taxes cannot be collected from the minority and where elections are won not by those who vote but by those who count the votes, and where the difference between army and jail is being erased more and more every year. The state acts are if it rules the nation and the people act as if they are obeying, while the bishops act as if they represent the conscience of the nation.

Several days after the conclusion of the council first on the Internet and later in the newspapers appeared information that the Kremlin was unhappy with the Moscow patriarchate because of the mention of "civil disobedience." The fuss was connected with the adoption of a new budget as if the Kremlin would remove the line of financing for the patriarchate. This is the least likely version: the patriarchate is not financed so much by a single budgetary line as by a thousand various and, in the main, informal resources.  It is possible for this financing to be stopped at any moment without any fuss. The uproar was useful to those in the Kremlin who wish to dismiss Andrei Protopopov, who has supervised the religion administration of the presidential apparatus for many years. However, it is more likely that we are dealing with a propagandistic approach that is typical of a regime that was removed from real life long ago and that is counting on refuting the notion of the Orthodoxization of the government that was formulated long ago. But it would hardly help to mention too glibly the proverb:  "Lovers' quarrels are soon ended."