RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND NON-GREAT OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Russian people for many years lived with the orientation to the "Great October Revolution" of 1917 as the beginning of history. The events of 3-5 October practically are revolution also. But this revolution can be only called Non-Great.

During the coup-des-etats of 1991 Patriarch Alexy was absolutly silent and neutral. Several high Church officials supported putchists. Most active were those priests who supported "White house". In 1993 most active again were those priests who supported "White House" - but they were not the same persons as in 1991.

Among the defenders of Hasbulatov were several priests and monks fron the nationalistic circles, particulary active publicist monk Tikhon. Deputy of the Supreme Soviet Fr. Alexy Zlobin, a firm supporter of the new Religious Freedom Act and prohibition of foreign missions served a Divine Liturgy in White House on Sunday, 3th and baptised several warriors of Rutzkoy. Fr. Vyacheslav Polosin misteriously dissappeared. He was not in the White House and was absolutely silent. Victor Aksyuchitz, the Deputy of the Supreme Soviet and the leader of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement was among the leaders of the defenders of the Parliament and the most ardent anti-Eltzin propagandists. He long beforehand migrated from democratic view to nationalistic and imperialistic position. The Mitropolit John of Petersburg issued a Deaclaration against Eltzin. A journalist deacon Andrey Kurayev (also ardent defender of the new Religious Freedom Act) published anti-Eltzinist pamphlet in one of the last issues of the news-paper of the Supreme Soviet. During the siege Rutzkoy as a President signed the new Religious Freedom Act (this act seems to be happy for the foreigners because from this moment on each attempt to resurrect the idea of prohibition will be associated with this tragicomical situation).

Practically nobody of the prominent Church leaders said anything in support of Eltzin. Fr. Glen Yakunin was with Eltzin certainly, but he is bitterly hated by Patriarch and other officials and represents only himself.

In such situation a completly neutral position of Patriatch created a situation of disbalance: supporters of Hasbulatov (priests included) were sure that they wan't be punished by the Church if Hasbulatov is defeated, beleivers-supporters of Eltzin had the impression that they will be not welcome by the Patriarchat even if Eltzin will win.

In the August of 1991 Patriarch was silent and neutral. In the October of 1993 he decided to be neutral and eloquent. He proposed to be a mediator between Hasbulatov and Eltzin and for three day the talks had taken place in his residence in Danilov monastery.

From the political point of view it was a clever and brilliant step. Patriarch represented himself to the world as a great political figure with his own role on the stage. Hasbulatov received an opporutunity to loose with honour. Eltzin got an opportinity to create a kind of legacy for his act. Psycologically Patriarch put himself in a position of a great Russian medieval saint bishops who were mediators in a difficult political situations between princes. All this situation was organized and played not only by the Patriartch but with two most intelligent and clever bishops of Patriarchat: Metropolit Cyrill (head of the Church External Relations Department) and Metropolit Yuvenaly (vicar of the Patriarch).

But the real benefit of the patriarch proved to be not at all large. May be it will be better for him to be silent as in 1991 (if not to say that bad publicity is better than no publicity). The matter is that the situation politically and psycologically was far from mediaval examples. Hasbulatov wasn't leading talks seriously - for this madmen it was just a trick to win some time. From confidential sources inside the Ptriarchat I've got information that the same could be said about Eltzin - he also wasn't looking for real agreement (the impression of a priest who was present during the talks). So Patriarch put himself in a false position of reconciling those who are not going to be reconcile and are going to fight. The authority of the Church was used (by both sides or only one - a tiny difference for a public) to mask real - war - intentions. Both sides later accused each other in utilizing the talks for preparing war. And although Eltzin later called the reconciling efforts of the Patriarch "blagorodniye" ("noble", "generous"), it seems that he will remember that in a crucial moment he gained no firm support from the Church.

To the ardent supporters of both sides the neatrality of the Patriarch is cowardness. But the majority of population are completely neatral (and atheistic). The Patriarch pretended to be an intercessor for the weak side (Hasbulatov) as St. Filipp was intetcessor for the boyars in the face of Ivan the Terrible. But public opinion  associates Hasbulatov with Ivan the Terroble - and not Eltzin. Hasbulatov, not Eltzin, is wilful and stupid person looking for the petty tyranny - that is the prevailing point of view. So the Patriarch psycologically had put himself in the position of the defender of the Ivan the Terrible, of the stronger, satanic side. The Silent Majoruty is indignant that putschist of 1991 are still unpunished - this majority will feel that Patriarch is a man who tried to save from the just punishment the most agressive and dishonest side of the political confrontation - Hasbulatov. Several drops of blood, shed on the 5th of October, will be seen on Patriarch's garments, wether it is just or not.

Above all public remembers that both sides of the conflict are unbeleivers (Eltzin and Hasbulatov are only a symbols of these sides). So for them Patriatch is not reliogious, spiritual authority. Using him as a mediator is a kind of game a even political cynicism. In the eyes of many people Moscow Patriatchy is guilty in collaboration for many years with Bolshevistic regime, of being the part of nomenclatura. From such point of view the act of the Patriarch will be understood not as an intercession of neutral figure but as one more evidence of the fact that Patriarchy is the part of communist establishment, alien to people but relative to bosses.

For the democratic intelligentsia the rethoric of Patriarch during all these days was too patriotic. He spoke much about Russia and little about concrete people. "Especially tragic is that Russian Derzhava [old-slavonic "empire"] can disintegrate nowadays", - wrote Patriarch on the 4th of October. Really, most news-papers accompanied information about the talks in Danilov monmastery by sarcastic comments (Most typical - "Komsomolskaya Pravda": a quiet information but a picture of the talks very resembling the icon of the Last Supper with huge letters under it: "No, this is not Last Supper...".

A great mistake was announcment made by the Patriarchy on Sunday, October the 3, that Alexy got an infarction. The phisician of the Patriarch happened to be among other phisicians near the battle. He was interviewed by some journalist and very soon everybody knew that Patriarch had no serious troubles with health. Then the Patriarchy declared that it was not infarction but only stenocardia. It was too late: everybody understood that in a false situation Patriarch found rescue in a "diplomatic illness".

On Friday, October 8 the Synod led by the Patriarch issued a prohibition for priests to be members of future Duma. Such prohibition is too openly aimed at one person: Fr. Gleb Yakunin who only has chances to be elected. It is very silly because Yacunin wan't follow this prohibition. Patriarch can punish him - but it is a great risk, because Yakunin is very important to Eltzin and because this prohibition is uncanonical from the Church point of view, unlawful from democratic point of view, unethical to the "simple people".

Now Patriarch undergone the risk to be a victim of the mass dissapointment in politics. Even the cleverest of Church officials are too isolated from the real life and too oriented not on people but on present political figures (which are to a great extent artificial). The results of there steps will be seen in future sociological investigations of public opinion.

November, 24, 1994